A multi-period market model is developed to examine the evolution of risk averse agents' con dence degrees in learning their abilities to obtain precise information and the properties of resulting market trading patterns in price volatility, trading volume, and expected pro ts. Agents initially do not know their abilities which are related to the qualities of private signals. They assess abilities from communicating and comparing quality of their own signals with that of others. Motivated by recent experimental ndings that over-and/or undercon dence in ability are often observed, agents are assumed to credit (blame) themselves strongly for favorable (unfavorable) outcomes. I demonstrate that under reasonable circumstances excessive price volatility can be associated with undercon dence. The non-monotonic relation between expected volume and expected pro ts is established, and the positive correlation between con dence level and risk aversion is emphasized.
Introduction
Many e orts have been devoted to modeling and testing the psychological ndings on decision making in past few decades. Overcon dence, the tendency of systematic overestimating one's ability and overestimating the accuracy of one's knowledge, 1;2 is considered to be \perhaps the most robust nding in the psychology of judgement" (De Bondt and Thaler, 1995, p.389) and is employed in behavioral nance to understand many puzzling economic phenomena at large and many nancial market anomalies in particular such as tremendous volume, excess volatility, speculative bubbles, short-term momentum, long-term reversal. Is overcon dence really universal and robust? Are there any features in experiments making subjects to behave di erently in experimental settings from economic settings? Is there evidence for undercon dence? In this paper I challenge the validity of the widely accepted notion of overcon dence, point out the limitation of supporting evidence and provide empirical evidence and theoretical foundation that undercon dence, as well as overcon dence, exist and play important roles in nancial markets. In particular, I examine their e ects on asset pricing and trading behavior in an economy when competition, communication and comparison between investors are incorporated into the conventional models.
To see my motivation, consider a very familiar situation. It is well known that the outcomes of economist job market uctuate at di erent times which greatly impacts next year job market candidates' con dence level. Even though a junior candidate is aware of her own ability and the quality of her work are somewhat independent of the senior peers', she might well be overcon dent or undercon dent about her own job landing, at least in a short period, be the senior peers' outcomes good or bad. In this case con dence about ability exhibits the property of complementarity. A more realistic fact is that when one learns about her ability or the accuracy of her knowledge, she 1 In the literature, overcon dence either refers to the observation that people are poorly calibrated in that they tend to express con dence in subjective judgement exceeding the objective accuracy, or refers to the observation that the subjective con dence intervals people assign to their estimates are far too narrow. Fischho , Solvic and Lichtenstein (1977) initiate the former de nition and Lichtenstein, Fischho , and Phillips (1982) provide a survey of the later de nition.
2 An array of phenomena is subsumed under the common label of overcon dence, like optimism, self-attribution bias, and illusion of control.
naturally takes into account the numbers of success and failure of her own and other targets such as peers, neighbors and close friends. By excluding the in uence of common factors or pure luck, such consideration helps one reach a more exact estimate. One will only shift upward her belief about ability and knowledge accuracy when the number of her successes exceed those of her targets. The same idea is applicable to decision making in nancial markets.
I build a multi-period model to study the evolution of agents' beliefs about their abilities in the competitive rational expectations framework a la Hellwig (1980) . Asset net supply uncertainty is introduced to prevent equilibrium price from being fully information revealing. Two types of agents have di erent and unknown abilities which help them to observe private signals of di erent precision regarding risky asset payo . At the end of each period, each type collects private signals and analyzes the precision, then communicate and compare this quality information with the other type. They update their beliefs, possibly in a biased way, about their own abilities accordingly.
I show that agents' ability learning will in uence the properties and dynamics of market trading patterns such as price volatility, expected trading volume, and expected pro ts.
For the convenience of analysis, attention is restricted to the situation that high-ability agents always observe more high precision signals than low-ability agents up to any trading period. Four plausible economy scenarios are considered under the hypothesis that when competition, communication and comparison are taken into account, agents exhibit over-and/or undercon dence in ability learning: all agents are rational in belief updating; overcon dent and undercon dent agents coexist; high-ability agents become overcon dent while low-ability ones are rational; and highability agents are rational but low-ability ones are undercon dent. The main ndings of the paper is summarized as follows. First, under reasonable conditions, price volatility is the highest in the \only low-ability agent being undercon dent" scenario. In contrast, most existing studies show that price volatility is increasing in overcon dence degree. Second, expected trading volume in the \only high-ability agents being overcon dent" scenario is lower than that in the fully rational economy after some initial trading periods. When this happens, larger overcon dence degree often implies lower expected trading volume. In contrast, existing studies show that expected trading volume is increasing in overcon dence degree. Third, in the \only high-ability agents being overcon dent" scenario, high-ability agents' expected pro t could be higher with larger overcon dent degree. In contrast, existing studies show that expected pro t is decreasing in overcon dent degree. The central message is that overcon dence may not be robust to explain many puzzling phenomena in nancial markets.
It turns out that the di erence mainly results from asset supply uncertainty which is originally introduced in the literature to circumvent the conceptual di culties such as \Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox" and \No-Trade Theorem" (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Milgrom and Stoky, 1982) . Odean (1998) studies the e ect of agent's overcon dence in a dynamic hedging model in which asset supply uncertainty is assumed away for tractability. Consequently, only private signals are incorporated into equilibrium price. My model shows that in the presence of asset supply uncertainty, equilibrium price aggregates private signals and asset supply with appropriate intensities.
In addition, there is a trade-o between intensities. Even when the variations of private signals and asset supply are identical, if some agents are undercon dent and trade less actively in response to private signals so that less information is injected to the economy, under reasonable conditions the intensity associated with asset supply will dominate that of private signals. As a result, the resulting price volatility might be higher than that if some agents are overcon dent. 3 Indeed, I show that price volatility is non-monotone in the variance of private signal and asset supply. With this result in mind, it is easy to understand others. Note that expected trading volume and expected pro ts are complicated nonlinear functions of price volatility. The simple relationship considered in existing studies are no longer valid. For instance, when high-ability but overcon dent agents trade with rational low-ability ones, the former has stronger incentive to trade more, but this does not necessarily imply that the total trading volume will be higher than full rational economy, since the latter may trade much less. The same logic can be applied to the expected pro ts analysis. The details will be provided in the main text.
Layout. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides brief review on new experimental evidence that undercon dence is prevalent in decision making, and on recent economic studies about the asset pricing implications of overcon dence. Section 3 develops a multi-period trading and learning model with two types of agents. Agents' beliefs updating is described in four economy scenarios. Section 4 studies the properties and dynamics of market trading patterns such as price volatility, expected trading volume and expected pro ts from an ex ante perspective.
Section 5 discusses the role of asset supply uncertainty in a wider context and proposes that direct information communication in nancial markets contributes to the observed market trading patterns. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Literature Review
In this section I brie y review new experimental ndings of over-and undercon dence coexistence, and other analytical studies in overcon dence literature, especially those relevant to my model.
New Experimental Evidence
There is indeed a large body of evidence in cognitive psychology and sociological psychology supporting overcon dence. 4 Lichtenstein, Fischho , and Phillips (1982) and Odean (1998) provide excellent and extensive reviews. Most papers in economics and nance take this evidence as exogenously given, and explore its consequence and implications.
Recently, the validity of overcon dence evidence has been challenged by a number of psychologists and economists. They either argue that overcon dence is not a robust nding in more carefully designed experiments, or nd that undercon dent subjects often coexist with overcon dent ones when competition and monetary rewards are incorporated into experiments. Erev, Wallsten and Budescu (1994) show that both over-and undercon dence can be obtained from the same set of data, indicating that the results are actually moderated by the research method used. Also the results of Juslin, Winman and Olsson (2000) indicate that the overcon dence bias depends on the selective attention to particular data sets. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) report that under-and overcon dence, as well as well-calibration are often simultaneously observed within the context of an experimental asset market. Klayman et al. (1999) emphasize that overcon dence depends on how the experimenter asks his/her questions, what he/she asks, and whom he/she asks. They conclude that: \In the 1980s, the question of bias in con dence judgements seemed settled: People are grossly overcon dent on all but the easiest of questions. In the 1990s, the matter was reopened, and a new conclusion was proposed: People are imperfect but generally unbiased judges of con dence; only the choice of questions was biased." Klayman et al. (1999) Even in many experiments subjects are asked to compare themselves to an average peer, the lack of direct comparisons and the ambiguity of comparison targets may lead to biased estimates.
Subjects are mostly overcon dent because they are free to choose a comparison in a lower rank or at higher risk. Perlo and Fetzer (1986) and Hoorens and Buunk (1993) show that the bias is reduced when the closest friend is used as speci c target. Alicke et al. (1995) argue that the reality constraints that are imposed by more direct comparisons diminish the better-than-average e ect.
In their experiments, they show that by individuating the target and providing personal contact the magnitude of the e ect decreases.
Earlier psychological studies do not neglect the possibility of undercon dence, indeed, they establish the relationship among overcon dence, undercon dence and the di culty of the judgement task. Lichtenstein, Fischho and Phillips (1982) report that overcon dence for di cult questions turns into undercon dence for easy ones. Interestingly, even this seldom questioned evidence is counter to recent studies. Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) report that choice behavior changes from overcon dence to undercon dence when the task changes from easy and familiar to non-familiar. Moore and Cain (2005) also provide experimental evidence that people believe themselves to be above average on simple tasks, and below average on di cult tasks.
Other Related Literature
Perhaps the earliest paper in behavioral nance, Roll (1986) uses CEO hubris, one form of overcon dence, to explain why many mergers and acquisitions are ex-post value-destroying. Indeed, recent empirical studies report that overcon dence is made rather than born. The hypothesis that successful agents tend to be overcon dent in their abilities is modeled in my paper. However, Roll leaves a question unanswered which is also neglected in the literature: Is the hubris of the target company's CEO lessened to some extent or even turned to be humility?
De Long et al. (1990) address the potential risks faced by rational arbitrageurs when competing with irrational noise traders. They are motivated by the observation that noise traders' overly optimistic or pessimistic beliefs about asset payo can create a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. In other words, both over-and undercon dence are possible in nancial markets. Kyle and Wang (1997) also allow investors to be either over-or undercon dent in interpreting the precision of private signals. 5
Directly based on earlier psychological ndings, Benos (1998) , Odean (1998) 6 , Wang (1998) develop models with exogenous overcon dent investors. All show that price volatility, expected trad-5 They also show that overcon dence strategy can serve as a commitment device in a duopoly game of hiring fund managers. They also show that overcon dence can be mitigated by an appropriately designed incentive scheme.
6 Odean (1998) examines the possibility that market maker is overcon dent. He nd that overcon dent market maker may dampen price volatility.
ing volume, market depth and informativeness increase with informed trader's overcon dence. On the other hand, agents' expected welfare decreases. 7 However, most of these results are questioned by Garc a, Sangiorgi and Uro sevi c (2007) and Xia (2008) . The former shows that when rational and overcon dent agents coexist and private information acquisition is endogenized, overcon dence does not a ect price volatility, information e ciency, and rational agents' welfare. Intuitively, the rational agents respond to the presence of overcon dent agents by reducing their information acquisition activities since the aggressive trading of the latter reveals more of their information through prices. The latter shows that information communication among investors gives rise to excessive price volatility, expected trading volume, etc. and lower expected pro ts. When investors are more overcon dent in their private signals, price volatility, expected trading volume, etc. decrease while expected pro ts increase.
Most analytical papers in overcon dence literature assume that agent is born with overcondence which does not change over time. There are a few exceptions. Gervais and Odean (2001) , to which the information setup in my model is similar, develop a multi-period market model describing both the process by which a single trader learns about her ability from the number of successful predictions and how a self-attribution bias in this learning can create overcon dence. The trader's expected level of overcon dence increases in the early stages of her career. Then, with more experience, she comes to better recognize her own ability. The patterns in trading volume, price volatility, expected prices, and expected pro ts resulting from this endogenous overcon dence are analyzed. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) consider both xed con dence level and outcome-dependent con dence level. For the latter, biased self-attribution causes investors' con dence to shift asymmetrically as a function of their investment outcomes. They also assume that a representative agent updates her belief of ability in isolation. 8 It deserve mentioning that Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) provide example that overcon dence may dampen price volatility. Their main theme is to show that overcon dence and self-attribution bias imply security market under-and overreactions, i.e., the short-lag autocorrelations (\momentum") and negative long-lag autocorrelations (\reversal") of stock returns. Du (2002) addresses these phenomena by the sequential entry of heterogenous investors with high, medium, and low con dence levels.
7 Benos (1998), Luo (2001), and Wang (2001) also studies the survival of overcon dent agents in nancial markets.
8 Some other reasons have been proposed to rationalize overcon dence. Weinberg (2004) assumes individual cares about and is risk averse over her belief about her ability. When she chooses tasks based on her information, endogenous overcon dence is expected to be optimal under some conditions.
The Economy
The model extends the standard one period competitive rational expectations framework a la Hellwig (1980) to a settings in which two types of agents trades competitively in a multi-period security market. Trade takes place in each single period t = 1; 2;
and consumption of a numeraire good at the end of each period. There are two assets in the economy. A riskless asset (the numeraire) has perfectly elastic supply so its price and payo are normalized to 1. A risky asset has stochastic payo Ṽ t at the end of each period t, unknown to all agents at the beginning of the period. The net supply of the risky asset is taken to be the realization of a exogenous random variableZ t for each period t, which can be thought of coming from noise/liquidity traders. The two types of agents di er only in ability which helps them observe one period advantageous private signals correlated to the true value of the risky asset. In a fully rational world, agents realize that abilities are independent. They do not believe so in otherwise situations. For simplicity, a continuum of agents of the same type are assumed to reside in a group, which can be as small as a community or as large as a country. The groups are labeled as I and J . A measure m h 2 (0; 1) of the agent population is of the type h (high-ability) while the measure m`= 1 m h 2 (0; 1) is of the type`(low-ability).
Although the model can accommodate the situation that all agents are of the same type, for our purpose di erent abilities are assumed to be common knowledge. Nonetheless, I postulate that any agent of one group, say I, does not known the ability of any member of I or that of J at the outset. A casual observer of nancial markets would be amazed by the pervasive interpersonal and interactive communication through social networks. In this economy social communication takes a special form. At the end of each trading period the representative agents i and j of two groups exchange some trading information with each other, from which they update their beliefs regarding abilities and pass new beliefs to members belonging to their own group respectively. How an agent's ability in uences her signal's quality and how she assesses her ability will be speci ed in detail below. Sometimes with a little abuse of notation, i also denotes the generic agent in the economy when the context is clear.
In short, the snapshot of the market trading and beliefs updating in a single period is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Preferences and Information Structure
All agents in the economy have CARA preferences with common absolute risk aversion coe cient and they maximize their utility over wealth period by period. At this moment agents' risk aversion magnitude is assumed to be invariant to their beliefs regarding abilities. At the beginning of period 1 every agent i 2 [0; 1] is endowed with deterministic wealth W i0 (in units of the numeraire), it is well known that under CARA preferences agent's demand for risky asset is independent of her initial wealth, so W i0 is set to be 0 for all i for convenience. At the end of each period t agent i is assumed to liquidate asset holdings and consume all of her end-of-period wealth W it . Let x it denote the number of units of the risky asset held by agent i, and let p t denote its price in period t.
We haveW it = x it Ṽ t p t . In short, in each period t agent i chooses the optimal x it to maximize her expected utility of end-of-period wealth or consumption
The expectation operator, E i , is based on agent i's information set F it . Since agents are price takers, p t is an element of everyone's information set at period t.
The information structure and the relationship between ability and signal quality are in the spirits of Gervais and Odean (2001) . 9 Recall that the risky asset has stochastic payo Ṽ t and net supplyZ t for each period t. At the beginning of each period t every agent i 2 [0; 1] observes a private signal~ it =Ṽ t +~ it" h it + (1 ~ it )"ì t with~ it 2 f0; 1g which forecasts the true stochastic payo Ṽ t perturbed by some additive noise term. The superscript h or`denotes the high or low quality of the signal. In words, agent gets a signal of either high or low precision prior to trading.
All random variablesṼ t ;Z t ;" h it ;"ì t are jointly and independently Gaussian, de ned on a probability 9 Gervais and Odean (2001) base their single insider trading model on Kyle (1985) . Introducing communication between at least two agents into their model is not a trivial extension. As agent's trading intensity choice is a ected by her information history, for analytical tractability market-maker has to keep track of each agent's information history. Even so, the multiplicity of agents' information realization imposes great challenge to market-maker's pricing strategy. Speci cally, no closed form solution of liquidity parameter exists. When there are multiple agents, I circumvent these di culties by considering trading mechanism a la Hellwig (1980) , which excludes the role played by market-maker. Extension of Gervais and Odean (2001) in the trading framework a la Kyle (1989) is also analytical intractable for similar reason. for some < 1. Furthermore, for any two agents the noise terms are independent, and all random variables are independent across periods. For notational simplicity the variance parameters and precision ratio are assumed to be constant across period. 10 Without loss of generality I normalize the payo of the risky asset so that = 1. The convention will be made that given V t , the average signal R 1 0 it = V t almost surely (a.s.) (i.e.,
. 11 At the end of each period t, the communication between the representative agents renders them to know whether their signal was of high precision (~ t = 1) or was of low precision (~ t = 0). The details of the communication will be given in the forthcoming analysis. Apparently agent's signal is more valuable when~ t is equal to 1, which is assumed to be the case with probabilityã. I interpretã as the agent's ability. A priori, agent's ability is high (ã = H) with probability 0 and low (ã = L) with probability 1 0 , where 0 < L < H < 1 and 0 < 0 < 1. Recall that agents belonging to the same group have the same ability. Furthermore, to facilitate the analysis I impose a strong assumption that agents in the same group observe diverse signals of the same precision.
In other words, the realization of~ it is the same for i 2 I but the realizations of" h it and"ì t are di erent. Bearing in mind the fact that agent i 2 I does not knows the ability of her own or of any agent j 2 J at the outset, every agent can only assess her ability through learning by trading and communicating. However, we abstract from the possibility that learning and trading might improve agent's ability per se.
Note that the di erent precisions of " h t and "t raise the possibility that the size of t may reveal something about the likelihood of~ t = 1 before trade and communication take place. This concern is relieved if we allow the precisions of " h t and "t to be changing over time. When they are assumed to be constant for ease of notation, we can nonetheless circumvent the possibility by requiring agents to be adaptive learners and implicitly ruling out active experimentation. That is, agents hold current beliefs regarding ability xed when deciding future asset demand, and they update their beliefs only after communication.
Communication and Self-Attribution Bias
At the end of trading period t, agents engage in social communication which is simpli ed by information exchange and comparison between two representative agents i and j with the aim to learn each other's abilities. This can be achieved by learning the qualities of signals that two groups obtained at the beginning of that period, as ability is correlated to signal's precision. To do so, a representative agent can rst collect a large number of signals of her group, and then exchange them with the other representative agent. Standard statistical exercise tells the precision of signals so that the representative agents know whether the values of ( it ; jt ) are (0; 0) ; (1; 0) ; (0; 1) or (1; 1). Very soon we will see how representative agents update their beliefs regarding abilities using such information. The new beliefs then are passed to agents in respective groups and a ect agents' asset demands in the next period t + 1.
At rst glance, the interested reader may question the plausibility of the described information collection and communication. The concern can be relieved if we allow the collected information to be agents' asset demands or realized pro ts. The representative agents can be thought of as two discount brokerage rms through which agents submit their limit orders. However, given the common knowledge of initial beliefs, risk aversion and observable market price, demands or pro ts are informationally equivalent to agents' private signals. The assumption that a continuum of agents of the same ability reside in the same group may seem extreme but in fact it is not crucial. Another essentially identical interpretation of the economy is illuminating and realistic too. Consider two full service brokerage rms with unknown abilities which help them to observe signals of same but independent distributions, being asset true payo or a pure noise. Formally, it =~ itṽt + 1 ~ it " it where normal distributions ofṽ t and" t are identical but independent, as considered by Gervais and Odean (2001) . Each rm then provides its own signal with additional independent and idiosyncratic noise terms to its clients, whom are of identical ability. 12 Asset payo is publicly announced after competitive trading. The communicating rms will know the pro le of ( it ; jt ) from which they update beliefs regarding abilities. 13 The paper's purpose is to explore the asset pricing implications of biased belief learning between two parties, no matter whether they are average investors or brokerage rms.
Let~ it = f~ i1 ;
;~ it g ands it = P t =1~ i be agent i's information history and the number of times that agent i's signal was of high precision in the rst t periods respectively. After social communication, the representative agents know it ; jt ; s it and s jt .
In this paper the model in which fully rational agents trade competitively serves as the benchmark. When agent i is said to be fully rational, she understands that her ability is independent from others and behaves as a Bayesian. Therefore at the end of period t, she ignores jt ; s jt and updates her belief that her ability is high given the history according to Bayes' rule:
Note that the posterior belief at the end of period t is captured by the su cient statistics it and is history-independent, i.e., di erent histories with same number of high precision signals lead to the same posterior belief. The fully rational agent i's updated expected ability at the end of period t is given by people succeed, they are inclined to attribute success to their innate abilities or learned knowledge rather than to chance or outside factors, and they tend to believe the reverse when they fail.
This \self-serving attribution" is exactly where ability or knowledge overcon dence comes from.
However, a scrutiny of earlier experiments and newly documented facts lead us to consider other possible version of beliefs updating in which one's perceptions of success and failure are attributed in a biased way only if her counterpart had the opposite outcome, and this kind of favorable attribution is not grounded otherwise. This is the case since when peer e ect is introduced, the role played by common outside factors is twofold. On the one hand, agents start to respect the outside factors when they had identical outcomes, therefore the self-serving attribution tendency is minimized. 16 On the other hand, when agents had distinct outcomes, their attribution biases are strengthened because no one can exalt or fault outside factors.
More precisely, the boundedly rational updating rule is given as follows. For any given i;t 1
and learning bias degrees
where subscript to \Pr" indicates the fact that the probability is calculated by a biased agent. jt can be de ned similarly. 17
The upward bias being larger than the downward bias is used to capture the possibility that people tend to overweight success more than overweight failure. Meanwhile, the opposite case can not be ruled out as the loss aversion literature suggests that people are usually more averse to loss than to gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler and Johnson, 1995) . It is noteworthy that traditional self-serving attribution theory appeared before the new ndings of loss aversion. Whatever is closer to the truth, allowing distinct learning bias degrees will make the posterior beliefs history-dependent and complicate the analysis greatly. 18 To see this consider a situation that at the end of two periods, s i2 = s j2 = 1. There are four possible histories: (i)
16 For simplicity the self-serving attribution bias is fully erased when agents observe information of the same quality. This, of course, can be relaxed without changing the main results.
17 Other alternative updating rules consistent with this intuition lead to roughly equivalent results. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) implement a di erent rule.
18 Allowing history-dependent posterior beliefs will not change the main results in this paper. When > , posterior beliefs can be described as follows. For realized information histories it and jt, denote by s + it the number that i > j , s + jt the number that i < j , s 1 t the number that i = j = 1, and t s
t the number i2 = f1; 0g, j2 = f1; 0g; (ii) i2 = f0; 1g, j2 = f0; 1g; (iii) i2 = f1; 0g, j2 = f0; 1g; (iv) i2 = f0; 1g, j2 = f1; 0g. According to the boundedly rational updating rule outlined above, it is easy shown that for agent i, the same posterior beliefs are obtained as
for histories (i) and (ii), and as
for histories (iii) and (iv). Therefore the same learning bias degrees in this situation not only make 2 identical no matter what the realized histories are, but also make it equal to 2 . In this sense, the bounded rationality can be compatible with full rationality when two representative agents have the same number of high precision signals. Recall that Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) observe that subjects exhibit well-calibration as well as over-and undercon dence within the context of an experimental asset market.
For convenience, I set = in the following discussion. This, together with (3.3) also characthat i = j = 0 in rst t periods for some 2 f1;
; tg. These can be charaterized by
The updated belief is given by it s
jt can be de ned similarly.
terizes the posterior beliefs in a straightforward way, 19
Heres it ands jt are su cient statistics for~ it and~ jt with respect to~ it . The biased agent i's updated expected ability at the end of period t is given by
jt (s j ; s i ) and jt (s j ; s i ) are de ned similarly. For ease of notation, we suppress s i ; s j and simply use it ; jt below. Also, 0 , the a priori belief of ability to be high is set to be 1=2.
Before we proceed, several comments are in order. First, we will see below that even though agents update their beliefs about abilities in a biased manner, they will realize their true abilities in the long run when they become more experienced. By contrast, a high-ability agent' posterior belief and expected ability, in a relatively short period, might be lower than those of a low-ability agent, as the latter happens to be lucky to get more high precision signals. Our modeling devices thus capture many familiar real life wisdoms. Second, even though we hypothesize that over-and undercon dence coexist when competition, communication and comparison are incorporated, in the following analysis we also explore some plausible scenarios in which one group of agents are fully rational to better understand the relationship between market trading patterns and biased beliefs.
For instance, after social communication representative agents i and j observe s i < s j , the former chooses to ignore s j and updates her belief in the way as speci ed in (3.1), while agent j's takes the comparison result into account and the downward bias is embodies in her posterior beliefs.
Lemma 1 Suppose agents i and j have received high precision signals s i and s j times in the rst t periods and s = s i s j , it (s i ; s j ) and it (s i ; s j ) are non-decreasing functions of and s.
19 Obviously, this simpli ed updating rule is linked to the history-dependent rule shown in preceding footnote because si sj = s 
Linear Equilibrium
As mentioned above, full rationality model serves as the benchmark. In the following analysis, I will consider several other scenarios including the cases that over-and undercon dent agents coexist, full rational agents compete against overcon dent agents, and full rational agents compete against undercon dent agents. For notational clarity, the equilibrium and its characterizations are often stated in the benchmark scenario. Relevant notations can be adjusted accordingly in other speci cations.
All information assumed so far is common knowledge among agents. For the described economy, the equilibrium is de ned in the fashion of rational expectations.
De nition 1 An equilibrium in the economy consists of a set of trading strategies x it : R 4 ! R for i 2 I, x jt : R 4 ! R for j 2 J , and a price function P t : ! R such that:
1. Each agent's trading strategy maximizes her expected utility of end-of-period wealth given her information set:
where F t = f t ; s i;t 1 ; s j;t 1 ; p t g
The market clears:
In the equilibrium analysis, it is conjectured that equilibrium prices are linear in risky asset payo and liquidity, that is, equilibrium prices of the form
Our objective is to nd t and t that are consistent with this conjecture. The standard technique yields the following result.
Theorem 1 Givens i;t 1 = s i;t 1 ;s j;t 1 = s j;t 1 , the unique competitive equilibrium price in period t is given by the expressionp
with the coe cients t and t satisfy:
where
The equilibrium demand of agent i in period t is given bỹ
11)
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
A remarkable feature of equilibrium price is that it is ultimately determined by agents' aggregate (or average) expected ability denoted by A, as other exogenous parameters are assumed to be constant (In particular, we have assumed that = 1). More importantly, the equilibrium price at period t does not depend on the realizations of~ it for i 2 I and~ jt for j 2 J , as the noise terms in private signals cancel out when a continuum of agents submit their demands. Surely this is not the case for individual agent's equilibrium demand for risky asset.
Note that in di erent scenarios, the notations of p t ; t ; t ; t and A t ; B t ; C t should be adjusted accordingly. For example, when over-and undercon dent agents coexist, A t is replaced by
As mentioned before, even though we hypothesize the coexistence of biased agents when competition, communication and comparison are introduced, we also explore some other scenarios in which one type of agents is fully rational and the other biased in ability learning. Such considerations help better understand the relationship between market trading patterns and biased beliefs. In particular, only by doing so can we disentangle the contributing forces of over-and undercondence, coming from upward and downward learning biases respectively. 20 We know in short run it is possible that inexperienced high-ability agents may be unlucky and receive fewer high precision signals than low-ability agents, making the model description and notations quite awkward. To circumvent these we assume that, without loss of generality, agents in group I are of high-ability, and more importantly, we always have s it s jt up to any period t, this being true at least in an ex ante perspective. As a consequence, two conceivable scenarios are of particular interests. When all high-ability agents in group I are overcon dent while all low-ability agents in group J rational, their aggregate expected ability is denoted by
When group I agents are rational while group J agents undercon dent, the corresponding value is
The economy scenarios are labelled as E 1 ; E 2 ; E 3 ; E 4 in order. 
Overcon dent Only high-ability agents are overcon dent
Undercon dent Only low-ability agents are undercon dent Table 1 : Four economy scenarios A large amount of research has been concentrated on the interaction of rational and overcondent agents in corporations and markets (Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001; Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2005 ; Garc a, Sangiorgi and Uro sevi c, 2007; among others). In contrast, only a few pay attention to the interplay between rational and undercon dent agents in similar settings. A remarkable exception is De Long et al. (1990) . Shortly we will see both scenarios yield novel asset pricing implications.
Immediately, we have:
Lemma 2 Assume that agents in groups I and J are of high and low abilities respectively, and s ht s`t for all t > 1, then
For further simplicity, we assume that the measures of two types of agents are equal, m h = m`= 1=2. 21
21 Agents in the model do not need to know the measures of groups. The speci ed approach of information and E 4 . For instance, in economy E 3 when group I agents are overcon dent while group J agents rational, in equilibrium agents altogether behave as if they mistakenly believe the precision of signals to be higher relative to that in benchmark economy E 1 . Apparently, this essentially makes our modeling of overcon dence as agents overestimating ability to be compatible with the most common modeling of it as agents overestimating precision of private signals. More importantly, in this paper the common risk aversion is assumed to be invariant to agent's belief of ability, but we clear see the close connection between biases in beliefs and risk aversions. In a sense, studying the implications of agents' over-and undercon dence is equivalent to studying the e ects of agents' varying risk aversions. Hellwig (1980) examines how agents' di erent risk aversions change the properties of equilibrium prices, while I extend the analysis to other aspects of market trading such as price volatility, expected trading volume and agents' expected pro ts.
Properties of the Model
In this section we analyze the e ects of agents' learning bias on the properties and dynamics of the economy in equilibrium. I introduce the measure of over-and undercon dence and show that the attribution bias result in dynamically evolving over-and undercon dence. I then look at the e ect of this changing over-and undercon dence on price volatility, trading volume, as well as agents'
communication and comparison between two representative agents makes the measures of groups irrelevant for belief updating. However, when agents can communicate and compare information quality individually, the number of communicating agents is crucial for belief updating. For instance, when one agent has a low quality signal and is compared to another agent with a high quality signal, she feels much better than the situation in which she is compared to ve other agents with high quality signals.
22 To see this, note that ; ; 2 ; s 2 ; 2 ; A ; B in Hellwig (1980) correspond to ; ; ; h ; ; 1= ; in my model respectively. Admati (1985) extends the single risky asset model of Hellwig (1980) to a multi-asset version. Our equilibrium conditions are equivalent to those characterized in her Theorem 3.1.
pro ts.
Individual Con dence Bias
Suppose trading in this security market lasts to in nity, we would expect that all rational agents in benchmark economy E 1 to eventually learn their exact abilities. Does this result still hold when agents learn their abilities with attribution bias? When the economy is populated by only one insider with unknown ability, Gervais and Odean (2001) show that the answer might be \no". In particular, they demonstrate that while a high-ability agent will learn her ability precisely in the long run, a low-ability insider may mistakenly do so if her learning bias is su ciently extreme, no matter how much experience she has. Fortunately, when it is common knowledge that there are two di erent types of agents in the economy, the answer to above question is \yes" since the high-ability agent will recognize her exact ability when she collect enough information about her signals' quality as t tends to in nity. This is shared with the low-ability agent in the presence of social communication. As a consequence, the latter must acknowledge her low-ability eventually. 23
Proposition 1 All agents, biased or not, will eventually learn their abilities correctly.
One central theme of Gervais and Odean (2001) is the evolution of agent's expected level of overcon dence. They show that with self-attribution bias, an trader's expected level of overcondence is pronounced in the early stages of her career. Then, with more experience, she comes to better recognize her own ability. In other words, their model predicts that more inexperienced agents will be more overcon dent than experienced agents. However, Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) hypothesize that when predicting asset prices, experiment participants are expected to be more cautious and less certain in the beginning of trading. As participants gain more experience across trading period, they are expected to increasingly place more weight on their predictions, overestimate the accuracy of their judgements and lower the boundaries of the con dence intervals.
This hypothesis is con rmed in their studies and is backed by Gri n and Tversky (1992) who report that experts may even be more prone to overcon dence than novices in certain tasks. 24 This discrepancy is mitigated in our model. To see this more clearly, note that the overcon dent agent 23 If this is not common knowledge, then the validity of Proposition ## requires that
24 In fact Barber and Odean (1998) nd that after controlling for gender, marital status, children, and income, younger investors trade more actively than older investors. But even younger investors have median age of 48.
in Gervais and Odean (2001) will update her belief in the following way
Price Volatility
Price volatility is measured by variance of the equilibrium price. LeRoy and Porter (1981) , and
Shiller (1981) demonstrate that it is hard to understand the excessive price volatility in security markets. Financial economists resort to agent's overcon dence as the underlying contributing forces. Most existing studies maintain that price volatility is increasing in agent's overcon dence degree. 25 Nonetheless, this is not always true in my model.
Lemma 3
In economy E 1 , conditional on agents i and j having received high precision signals s i and s j times in the rst t periods, i.e.,s it = s i ;s jt = s j , the price volatility in period t + 1 is given
When 5 2 4 > 0, price volatility is strictly decreasing in
and is strictly increasing in A t+1 otherwise. When 5 2 4 0, price volatility is increasing in A t+1 . In other economy scenarios, price volatility and A t+1 are adjusted appropriately.
At the rst glance, it may not be very clear why price volatility hinges on agents' aggregate (or average) expected ability A. As mentioned earlier, it plays the role of changing agents' risk aversion or changing the precision of noise terms in their signals when they feel uncertain about abilities. We are in particular interested in the situation when price volatility is strictly decreasing in agents' aggregate expected ability. When this happens, agents in economy scenario E 4 where only low-ability agents are undercon dent essentially exhibiting the highest risk aversion, the resulting price volatility is somewhat unexpected but undeniable the highest. Meanwhile, we observe the lowest price volatility in economy E 3 where only high-ability agents are overcon dent. In addition, the price volatilities in benchmark economy E 1 and in \over-and undercon dent agents coexisting" scenario E 2 are in-between, the former being higher than the latter.
To convince readers, I provide a numerical example to show that it is indeed possible that high price volatility is associated with undercon dence rather than overcon dence when reasonable exogenous parameters are chosen. I rst set H = 0:8 and L = 0:4 so that on average agents i and j receive high precision signals 4 and 2 times in the rst 5 periods, 8 and 4 times in the rst 10 periods, and so on. Learning bias degree and the precision ratio are set to be 2 and 0:1 respectively. This four parameters' in uence on the satisfaction of condition (4.1) are minimal.
Next, from preceding discussion we know the net supply variance plays an important role in determining price volatility. Since I have set asset payo variance = 1, a large will render net supply variation to dominate payo variations in price volatility, consequently even at a low risk aversion level price volatility will exhibit increasing in and decreasing in A. Alternatively, we 26 The opposite situation happens if we assume that agents only observe private signals correlated with asset net supply prior to trading. Under this assumption, we still have the non-monotonicity result of price volatility.
can directly see that a large will make it is easier for the condition (4.1) to get satis ed. Hence I set = = 1 to create obstacle for the goal. Gervais and Odean (2001) also use these values in their numerical analysis. Third, the magnitude of absolute risk aversion is equally important.
Note that for a very low it is more plausible that 5 2 4 0, so price volatility is increasing in agents' aggregate expected ability. 27 Therefore the more overcon dent agents are, the higher price volatility results in. Although some studies report low value of risk aversion from subjects attending TV game show (Beetsma and Schotman, 2001 ), other researchers consider to be at least larger than 3 (Hong and Stein, 1999; Veldkamp, 2005) . 28 As a compromise, I set = 1, the most common value selected by a large number of papers (Yuan, 2005) . Finally the high precision of noise terms h is set to be 1. Given these parameter values, we have A = 0:111, A = 1. Figure   2 shows the expected price volatilities in four economy scenarios as trading and learning unfold.
Denote period t + 1 ' s price volatility in economy E k by volatility t+1 (E k ) for k = 1; ; 4, we have:
Proposition 2 Given s it s jt in the rst t periods and learning bias parameter > 1, when
we have
Moreover, when condition (4.2) is satis ed, the price volatility in economy E 3 (E 4 ) are lower (higher) when is larger.
Some comments are in order. First and most importantly, the non-monotonicity of price volatil-27 Beetsma and Schotman (2001) use data from a Dutch TV game show and estimate absolute risk aversion to be 0:12 0:20: Nonetheless, the disadvantage of risk aversion estimation using TV game show should not be neglected. Arguably, the behaviour of game-show players may not be representative for behaviour outside the studio. Players are often in uenced, for example, by social pressure from the audience, remarks and directions by the game-show host and the unique event of being on national TV. Consequently they generally display lower risk aversion. The authors point out another possibility, \house money e ect", renders the estimates to understate player's true risk aversion as players are not yet accustomed to the money they have won so far thus are more willing to bet their stakes. A recent study by Post et. al. (2006) estimates players' relative risk aversion in a popular global TV game show \Deal or No Deal". They nd that the degree of risk aversion di ers widely across players and the average relative risk aversion is 1.15, which is also believed to be lower than true value.
28 Empirical estimate of risk attitude is often plagued by problems of joint hypotheses and improper stimuli for the subjects. Laboratory or classroom experiments generally use hypothetical or small real stakes, and subjects may not be su ciently motivated to act optimally and reveal their true preferences and beliefs. Natural experiment like TV game show, often involving simple decision rules and large monetary stakes can overcome this incentive problem to some extent. ity in some exogenous parameters is crucial for this new nding, which results directly from the randomness of both asset payo and net supply. When agents observe a high market clearing price, they are unsure whether it means good news of asset payo or it simply re ects low net supply. It can be easily shown that when agents are certain about asset net supply, the resulting price volatility is monotone in the variance of asset payo . We all known that the introduction of random asset net supply is mainly to overcome the \Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox" in the sense that agents have no incentive to acquire costly signals in the rst place if the observable equilibrium prices fully reveal a su cient statistic of underlying signals. If this is the case, how could equilibrium prices aggregate agents' signals? Even if the signals are costless, agents won't condition their demand on private signals it since they are less informative than equilibrium prices (Grossman, 1978; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) . To the best of my knowledge, it is new to the literature that such introduction leads to non-monotonicity of price volatility. Second, if information communication and comparison are absent, and all agents exhibit self-serving attribution bias in beliefs updating as speci ed in Gervais and Odean (2001) , the resulting overcon dence among all agents will render price volatility to be even lower than that in economy E 3 when a similar condition is satis ed. Third, this comparison result does not depend on the speci ed updating rule (3.4). In particular, when condition (4.2) holds, allowing downward bias degree to be smaller or larger than the upward bias won't change the price volatility patterns from ex ante perspective. In fact a very slight learning bias in economy E 4 still generates the highest price volatility. Last but not the least, even when the price volatility patterns are reversed for other exogenous parameters so that price volatility in economy E 3 becomes the highest, we have that price volatility in economy E 2 is higher relative to that in benchmark economy E 1 . Hence the coexistence of over-and undercon dent agents is not incompatible with the observed excessive price volatility in security markets. Ruling out the possibility of undercon dence is not only unwarranted but also unnecessary.
Trading Volume
The enormousness of trading volume in security markets is also a big puzzle to economists since the \No-Trade Theorem" of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) which claims that if it is common knowledge that all agents are rational and the current allocation is ex-ante Pareto e cient, then new asymmetric information will not lead to trade, provided agents are strictly risk averse and hold concordant beliefs. The noise or liquidity trading, i.e., the randomness of asset net supply and agents' heterogeneous prior beliefs have been proposed as signi cant motives for trade. Recently agent's overcon dence is particularly favored because of the evidence from earlier psychological ndings. In existing studies it is unanimous that expected trading volume in the economy populated by overcon dent agents is higher than that in full rational economy. Again, my model does not support this claim.
In benchmark equilibrium, agent i optimally determines demand for risky asset.
where B it and C it , characterized in () and () respectively, are agent i's trading intensities on private signal and observed price in period t respectively. In other economy scenarios, B it and C it need to be adjusted accordingly.
It is assumed that after asset realizes its payo at the end of each period, agents liquidate asset holdings and consume all of their end-of-period consumption, the trading volume in period t + 1 is thus de ned by, 29
29 Lo and Wang (2000) discuss di erent de nitions of trading volume.
where the coe cient 1=2 corrects the double counting when summing the shares traded over all agents. Lemma 5 provides the value of expected trading volume for the following discussion.
Lemma 4
In economy E 1 , conditional on the agents i and j having received high precision signals s i and s j times in the rst t periods, expected trading volume in period t + 1 is given by
where var (x h;t+1 js i ; s j ) is given as (A.7) in Appendix. var (x`; t+1 js i ; s j ) can be calculated similarly.
In other economy scenarios, expected trading volume is adjusted accordingly.
From appendix we see that the exact forms of var (x h;t+1 js i ; s j ) and var (x`; t+1 js i ; s j ) are quite involved. Unlike the price volatility in which the expected abilities ht and `t of two types of agents play their roles collectively through aggregate expected ability A t+1 , expected trading volume in period t + 1 is determined not only by A t+1 but also by ht , `t individually, as all other exogenous parameters are assumed to be constant across periods. The way that ht ; `t and A t+1
enter into the expression of expected trading volume makes it a formidable task to analyze the resulting comparative statics. The ultimate dependence of expected trading volume on learning bias degree is equally ambiguous. To see this more clearly, in period t + 1 consider a relatively simple comparison of \all agents being rational" and \only high-ability agents being overcon dent" scenarios in economies E 1 and E 3 . As low-ability agents in group J are always rational under these two scenarios, all di erences in market trading patterns are ultimately caused by the distinctions of ht and ht . Even so, it is still extremely hard to answer whether expected trading volume in economy E 3 is always higher than that in economy E 1 . First of all, let's take a close look of the high-ability agents' demands for risky asset in economies E 1 and E 3 . Suppose in some period the realizations of signal~ and pricep in both economies are very close, then the magnitudes of trading intensities B h and C h in Equation (3.10) of high-ability agents in group I determine which demand is larger. On the one hand, in economy E 3 overcon dent agents will de nitely increase their trading intensity B h on private signals because either they overestimate the precision of signals or they become less risk averse. On the other hand, in determining their demands, overcon dent agents also respond to observable price, on which the change of their trading intensity C h is inde nite.
This can be easily seen through a scrutiny of Equation (3.12). It is likely that overcon dent agents' larger trading intensity B h on signals implies larger variation in price, leading the very agents to increase trading intensity C h on price too. As a result we are still uncertain whether high-ability agents' demand in economy E 3 is higher or lower because the form of Equation (3.10). When we take into account group J agents' asset demands and the resulting total expected trading volumes (which involves sum of the absolute value of demands) in both economies, the matter becomes more obscure. In addition, the components of expected trading volume -the variance of agents' demand -is a ected by agents' trading intensities as well as price volatility. 30 A quick examination of Equation (A.6) in appendix, that is,
reveals that the interactions among them are far from simple. Preceding analysis has shown that the price volatility, a ected by variations in asset payo and net supply, is non-monotone in several exogenous parameters, which complicates the property of expected trading volume. Even we are sure of the comparative statics of trading intensities and price volatility, their combined in uence on expected trading volume is still ambiguous. A number of remarkable features stand out. First, except for the rst period in which agents have common prior, expected trading volumes in \all agents being rational" scenario E 1 and \only high-ability agents being overcon dent" scenario E 3 are higher than those in \over-and undercondent agents coexisting" scenario E 2 and \only low-ability agents being undercon dent" scenario E 4 until agents realize their true abilities. Even so, a direct analytical comparison of expected trading volumes in some scenarios, for instance, economies E 1 and E 4 , is still pretty di cult.
Second, we see that expected trading volumes in di erent scenarios exhibit diminishing patterns for all trading periods until agents' beliefs converge with the only possible exception being that in economy E 3 , expected trading volume could be increasing for some initial periods. This is understandable. When trading begins, agents learn their abilities through information communication over time. In general, high-ability agents will increase their trading volumes as they indeed observe signals of high precision or they are prone to believe so, while low-ability agents will do the opposite. Numerical simulation shows that on average the magnitude of decreasing volumes outweighs that of increasing ones, despite the same measure of agents in groups I and J . In economy E 3 analysis in section 3.1 reveals that the degree of high-ability agents in group I overestimating their ability is most severe in some initial periods, they trade far more aggressively than what they do in later periods, while the changes of trading volume coming from low-ability but rational agents in group J is not that much. This interplay leads to the increasing portion of expected trading volumes in economy E 3 . All these discussions can be seen evidently in a decomposition exercise, as shown in Figure 4 , if we roughly measure the expected trading volumes of two types of agents by m h p var (x h;t+1 js i ; s j ) =2 and m`pvar (x`; t+1 js i ; s j ) =2 respectively. 31
31 It is very interesting to note that, in the left panel of Figure 4 , the rough measure of high-ability agents' trading volume in economy E4 is always higher than that in economy E1 although agents are alway rational in learning their ability (The opposite is true for low-ability agents in economies E4 and E1, see the right panel of Figure 4 ). The distinction solely results from agent's di erent trading intensities on price. In economy E4 where low-ability agents are undercon dent, their demand a fects the equilibrium price in such a way that it is optimal for high-ability agents to react more to price than they do in economy E1. The same is true for high-ability agents' trading volumes in economies E2 and E3 for similar reason. Finally and most relevantly for our purpose, Figure 3 reveals that in several initial periods the expected trading volume in economy E 3 is higher relative to that in economy E 1 , but this pattern is completely reversed later on. Similar pattern applies to economies E 2 and E 4 where the distinction also comes from whether high-ability agents are overcon dent or rational in learning.
The decomposition exercise in Figure 4 shows that expected trading volumes of rational low-ability agents in economy E 3 are always much lower than those of the very agents in economy E 1 , while overcon dent high-ability agents' expected trading volumes in economy E 3 is rst higher but then dominated by those of rational high-ability agents in economy E 1 . When put together, we observe a new pattern of expected trading volumes. It is partially consistent with existing studies but for most times we see sharp contrast. Admittedly, an analytical proof is hard to obtain. As explained before, the di erence in expected trading volumes is solely determined by the distinction of group I agents' expected abilities ht and ht . However, the way that group I agents' expected ability enters into the form of expected trading volume renders comparative statics analysis intractable to a large extent. For instance, numerical simulation demonstrates that slight changes of ht ht , which are always of the same sign for t > 1, will dramatically change the sign of the di erence between expected trading volumes in two scenarios at some point.
It is noteworthy to highlight that the pattern of expected trading volumes in four economy scenarios is retained for many sets of parameters specifying the economy and information structures (perhaps for all sets, no numerical counterexample is found). 32 This is even the case when the patterns of price volatility are reversed for some sets of parameters so that the price volatility in \overcon dent" scenario E 3 is the highest while that in \undercon dent" E 4 the lowest.
32 I x = 1, m h = m`= 1=2 and 0 = 1=2 for numerical simulations.
Denote period t+1 ' s expected trading volume in economy E k by volume t+1 (E k ) for k = 1;
; 4, the ndings in numerical simulation is summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 For many sets of parameters specifying the economies, given s it s jt for all periods t, there exists some periods t > 1 such that
Another speci c question I want to reexamine is the relationship between expected trading volume and overcon dence degree. Most existing studies maintain that when agents mistakenly believe that their private signals are more precise, expected trading volume is higher largely because overcon dent agents trade more aggressively. For my purpose the attention is restricted to \only high-ability agents being overcon dent" scenario E 3 . My model disagree with this simple monotone relationship. Before we go to the detail, I need to emphasize that the economy E 3 is distinct from the economies considered in other studies in two aspects. First, rational agents are usually assumed away in those studies. Either a single overcon dent agent plays a strategic game with market-maker, or many overcon dent agents trade competitively. Second, even when rational agents trade against overcon dent agents, both are certain about the types of each other and the overcon dence degree is constant. Figure 6 shows expected trading volumes in economy E 3 with varying learning bias degree . The reasons of overall diminishing patterns with possible exceptions are clearly related to the second and third points outlined above. In particular, after several initial periods, expected trading volumes are strictly decreasing when high-ability agents' learning bias degree is larger. At this moment we should be well prepared for these ndings. The decomposition exercise, summarized in Figure 6 , shows that it is indeed the case that high-ability agents trade more risky asset as they become more experienced (the opposite, to a larger extent, is true for low-ability agents), but there is no guarantee that they will trade more when they become more overcon dent (interestingly, low-ability agents trade even less when this happens). The complicated interactions among two types of agents' asset demands, information quality and market-clearing prices render the conventional wisdom unwarranted. In other words, more overcon dent agents do not necessarily trade more aggressively.
In fact, these simulation exercises further con rm preceding discussions from a new perspective.
It is deserve mentioning that similar patterns of expected trading volumes with varying learning bias degrees are retained in economy E 3 for many sets of exogenous parameters (no numerical counterexample is found). 
Proposition 4
In economy E 3 where high-ability agents in group I and low-ability agents in group J are overcon dent and rational in learning their abilities respectively, higher expected trading volume is not necessarily associated with larger learning bias degree . 
Expected Pro ts
I turn to address the e ects of agents' learning bias on the properties and dynamics of their expected pro ts in equilibrium. They are important because of two concerns. Models of irrational behavior at large and of overcon dence in particular are criticized by the argument that rational agents will outperform irrational agents and eventually drive the latter to the margins of markets. This view has been challenged by De Long et al (1990) , and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) , among others who build models in competitive rational expectations framework a la Hellwig (1980) . Basically, these authors argue that irrational agents may earn higher expected pro ts than rational ones by bearing larger amount of risk created by higher demand. For instance, overcon dent agents overreact to their private signals therefore demand more risky assets whose expected payo s are higher. 33 However, the results of expected pro ts are somewhat mixed. When overcon dence is modeled in the strategic rational expectations framework a la Kyle (1985) . Kyle and Wang (1997) show that \Prisoner's Dilemma" arises between two agents in the sense that both optimally choose to be overcon dent of private signals, even though their equilibrium payo s is lower than those if both are rational. Gervais and Odean (2001) show that a single insider's expected pro ts are decreasing in her learning bias degree.
Lemma 5 Conditional on the agents i and j having received high precision signals s i and s j times in the rst t periods, expected pro t of agent i in period t + 1 is given by
where (y) = + y (1 ) .
Given s it s jt for all t, high-ability agent' expected pro t is higher than that of low-ability agent.
Not unexpectedly, we once again face the situation that agent i's expected pro t in period t + 1 is determined by her expected ability it as well as the aggregate expected ability A t+1 , a ecting agent's trading behavior and equilibrium price respectively. The ultimate in uences of learning bias degree on expected pro ts in di erent economy scenarios are obscure, to say the best. I have to rely on numerical simulations to gain insights about patterns of expected pro ts. Fortunately, before doing so an a rmative conclusion can be drawn: From the ex ante perspective in the sense that agents observe high precision signal in proportion to their real abilities, then high-ability 33 Of course irrational agents' expected utilities are lower relative to otherwise identical rational agents because they acts suboptimally. agents, whatever rational or overcon dent, on average earn more than low-ability agents. This is evident in Figure 7 under the same exogenous parameters used before. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. No matter high-ability agents are rational or overcon dent, their private signals are indeed more precise on average. Other things equal, this implies more expected pro ts. Moreover, as trading and learning unfold their evaluation of ability become more accurate.
Consequently, their expected pro ts rise over time and converge to the highest level. The opposite characterizes the dynamics of low-ability agents' expected pro ts. Figure 5 , we see that expected pro ts are more or less related to agents' trading behavior.
For instance, on average high-ability agents trade more and earn more in economy E 4 relative to economy E 1 , and same is true in economy E 2 relative to E 3 . However, we should also note that trading more does not necessarily imply that earning more, and vice versa. Although high-ability agents' expected pro ts can be ranked orderly in Figure 7 , we clearly can not rank their expected trading volume in the same way. At the same time, comparing Figure 7 with right panel of Figure   5 , we can rank both expected pro ts and expected trading volume of low-ability agents, but the one-to-one relationship does not exist. For instance, low-ability agents trade more but earn less in economy E 3 relative to economy E 4. Second, when two types of agents compete together, rational agents' expected pro ts may be higher (resp. lower) than overcon dent (resp. undercon dent) agents' when their competitors behave di erently. 34 For instance, for high-ability agents rational ones in E 4 on average earn more than overcon dent ones in economy E 3 , and for low-ability agents rational ones in economy E 3 earn less than undercon dent ones in economy E 4 .
We can understand above viewpoints such as \trading less does not necessarily imply earning less" from another perspective. Recall that in left panel of Figure 6 when high-ability agents become more overcon dent while low-ability agents are always rational in economy E 3 , the formers may trade less after several initial periods. The following Figure 8 , using the same exogenous parameters chosen before, reveals that high-ability agents may then still earn more.
Proposition 5
In economy E 3 where group I agents and group J agents are overcon dent and rational in learning their abilities respectively, lower expected pro ts is not necessarily associated with larger learning bias degree. The logic behind this result is not surprising, as we are already familiar with the nonlinear relationship between expected pro ts and price volatility. To see this more clearly, remember 34 Note that in Figure 7 , it is the case that \other thing being equal, on average overcon dent (undercon dent) agents earn more (less) than others." informed agents' pro ts come from noise traders' loss. When high-ability but overcon dent agents trade more aggressively, they take a larger share of pro ts relative to rational low agents. Their higher risk is compensated by higher return. Note that this is not always true, it is possible that overcon dent agent's expected pro t is decreasing in her overcon dent degree. For instance, when = 0:2, we have such an example. For low-ability but rational agent, for most sets of parameter the expected pro t is also decreasing in learning bias parameter. 
The Role of Asset Random Net Supply
As is well known, randomness of asset net supply, or noise/liquidity trading, is introduced into competitive or strategic rational expectations frameworks in order to circumvent the troubles of \Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox" and \No-Trade Theorem". This paper shows that this uncertainty has somewhat unexpected e ects on market trading patterns, at least in the competitive rational expectations framework. For instance, the non-monotonicity of price volatility in some exogenous parameters lies behind our new ndings regarding expected trading volume and pro ts. Odean (1998) examine the role of overcon dence a la a multi-period version of Hellwig (1980) . The author shows that price volatility, expected volume are increasing in agent's overcon dence degree.
Notably, the net supply of risky asset is assumed to be constant in every trading period. The purpose of doing so is to show that \the absence of exogenous noise in this model demonstrates that, with overcon dence, orderly trading can take place in response to information even when no noise is present". Also it is understandable to make this simpli cation in a complicated dynamic trading model to ease expositions, the implications of supply uncertainty on market trading patterns are sacri ced.
It is indeed true that the role of asset random net supply is minimal in a ecting market trading 35 A close inspection of (4.5) shows that a su cient condition for this is h A o 1. The necessary condition can be much weaker.
patterns in some strategic rational expectations models such as the risk neutral version of Kyle (1985) . For instance, the variance of noise trading does not a ect price volatility because agents scale up their trading intensities on private signals in response to an increase in the amount of noise trading. Nonetheless, the supply uncertainty has much greater in uence if risk neutral agents are replaced by risk averse ones. Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) nicely illustrate that a number of conclusions derived in Kyle (1985) cannot be maintained when traders are risk averse.
The Role of Information Communication
Trading activity is economic as well as sociological. Recently a new and growing empirical literature has documented that information communication a ects individual trading behavior and market trading patterns in nancial markets (Wysocki, 1998; Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004a, 2004b; Antweiler and Frank, 2004) . 36 Prompted by these ndings, Ozsoylev (2005) builds analytical model and establishes that when investors directly and truthfully share information in established social network prior to competitive trading, the resulting equilibrium may account for the observed high volatility ratio of price to fundamentals. Xia (2007a) shows that, in a context of strategic trading, information communication in social network generating asset pricing and welfare implications accord well with aforementioned empirical ndings. For example, investors will trade more actively but less pro tably in the presence of information communication.
In particular, Xia (2007a) allows agents to be overcon dent in private signals in the sense that they incorporate a disproportionally large weight of private signals relative to other information in communication. He demonstrates that price volatility, expected trading volume are strictly decreasing in agents' overcon dence degree. These results are opposite to ndings in overcon dence literature reviewed in introduction. 37 Interested readers are encourage to refer to Xia (2007a) for details. Moreover, Xia (2007a) further argues that information communication in nancial markets can alternatively explain some intriguing empirical ndings in overcon dence literature.
For example, Barber and Odean (2001) document that on average men trade more and earn less 36 Although economists have long recognized the role of social communication in nancial markets. Direct information communication is seldom explored for two reasons. First, following the tradition of general equilibrium theory, economists mainly focus on the situation that investors utilize their information monopolistically and exclusively. They may infer other's information from observable prices or actions but seldom engage in direct information exchange. Second, although survey data have long revealed that interpersonal communication is more in uential in a ecting investment decision than traditional media, only until very recently have nancial economists found actual supporting data from individual trading accounts. 37 In the model each agent has a private signal and receives information from others through communication. Simply put, the \received information" aggregates all private signals in some particular way. When agent is more overcon dent in her private signal, the variance of received information actually turns out to higher, i.e., received information is less precise. Overall agents trade less aggressively and that is why price volatility and expected trading volume become lower. than women. Barber and Odean (2002) report that when investors switch from phone-based to online trading, they trade more actively and less pro tably than before. For the former, they cite psychological research that men are more overcon dent than women in areas such as nance.
For the latter, they explain the poor performance of online investors by their overcon dence since online investors perform well prior to switch and are more overcon dent in their ability in the new trading platform due to self-attribution bias. Instead, in the view of Xia (2007) , information communication plays at least a complementary, if not entirely substitutable, role in accounting for these ndings. Casual observation and anecdotal evidence suggest that relative to women, men are more prone to exchange news regarding asset performance and wealth accumulation. Similarly, it is routine for online traders to participate in information sharing and discussion on Internet stock message boards.
Conclusion
After nearly a century of e ort by mathematicians, Grigori Perelman sketched a solution to the This somewhat dramatic story, combined with other new ndings in psychological experiments, lead us to cast doubt on the widely accepted notion that people tend to exhibit overcon dence in 38 The Fields Medal is a prize awarded to two, three, or four mathematicians not over 40 years of age at each International Congress of the International Mathematical Union, a meeting that takes place every four years. 
A Appendix: Proofs of Main Text Results
Proof of Theorem 1. We conjecture thatp t = tṼt tZt .
Consider an agent i to whom it = 1 happens with probability i;t 1 ,
x it ( it = 1) = E Ṽ t it ; p t ; s i;t 1 ; s Proof of Propsition 1. Suppose (ã i ;ã j ) = (H; L) for i 2 I and j 2 J , we show agents i's updated posterior beliefs it will converge to 1 almost surely as t ! 1: Agent is expected to observe signal of high precision a fraction a of the time. When t ! 1, for unbiased agent i, we have It is easily shown that f (x) is strictly increasing if 0 < x H. Note that
This yields the desired result for rational agent i. 
Obviously it will converge to 1 as t ! 1.
Since it is common knowledge that agents of two di erent types compete against each other and the convergence results of it ; it are shared with agent j, biased or not. Agent j 2 J will eventually acknowledge her low-ability.
Proof of Proposition. Given (s i;t = s i ;s j = s j ) and the equilibrium conditions speci ed in Theorem 1, It is easily seen that the monotonicity of price variance depends on the last two terms in the numerator.
Proof of Proposition 2. This follows immediately from Lemma 4 and Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma. Without loss of generality, we can assume agents in group I are of high-ability and use ht to denote the expected ability of agents in group I at the end of period t. Similarly, we can de ne `t of agents in group J .
Givens it = s i ;s jt = s j , we calculate that 
